One morning a customer calls: "We got a strange invoice email from you." You sent nothing of the kind. That is the moment to treat it as a real case of an email account compromised. We built the order below from how support teams handle these incidents in practice, because in this kind of work the sequence matters more than any single trick.
One thing up front: getting the account back is not enough. While inside, an attacker often leaves small doors open (a forwarding rule, an extra app password, a connected client) that survive a password change. So the plan runs in two directions: cut access first, then clear the traces.
Short answer: The moment you suspect a takeover, change the password from a clean device, sign out all sessions and switch on two-factor authentication. Then delete hidden forwarding and filter rules, review sent mail to scope the damage, and notify your team, affected contacts and, where required, regulators.
Signs: is mail leaving your account?
The usual signs: messages in your Sent folder that you did not write, replies from contacts asking "what was that email?", sign-in alerts from devices or countries you do not recognise, a password that suddenly stops working, and incoming mail quietly vanishing. That last one deserves attention. Attackers frequently set a rule that moves anything containing words like invoice, IBAN or payment into another folder or the trash, so you never see the reply chain.
If you spot any one of these, do not wait. Spending time on certainty buys the attacker time.
First 30 minutes: cut access
First think about which device you are on. Your computer may carry malware; change the password from it and the new one may be captured too. Use your phone or another clean device if you can.
The order: change the password to a long passphrase used nowhere else, change it anywhere else the old one was reused, end all open sessions and turn on two-factor authentication. On the company side the admin panel helps here: an administrator can suspend the user and reopen the mailbox with one click when cleanup is done. In Postanex that action, and the 2FA policy for mailboxes, are handled by the administrator. Why passwords alone are not enough, and how to choose a method, is covered in our two-factor authentication and passkeys guide.
If you are an administrator, widen your view a little: other systems that share this password need changing today too.
Clearing hidden forwards and rules
This is the step most often skipped, and it is the one that costs the most. After the password change, check these: automatic forwarding addresses, filter rules that move or delete incoming mail, the reply-to setting, foreign links in the signature, connected phone and desktop clients, and any app passwords. If the attacker left one of them behind, copies keep flowing after you think everything is fixed.
As you review, delete every rule you do not recognise, and take a screenshot of anything you are unsure about before you remove it. Rule names are often innocent-looking, a single dot or a blank space. Anything that looks odd may be a sign of something you cannot see.
Scoping: what was accessed?
Now ask the calm questions. How long has the attacker been inside? The oldest suspicious message in Sent usually tells you. What did they read? If the mailbox holds password-reset emails, contracts, ID scans, invoices or customer lists, assume those were seen. Who did they write to on your behalf? Note the suspicious items in Sent and Deleted Items and list the recipients.
That inventory is the basis for the next step, notification. Saying "nothing happened" without knowing the scope is wrong, and so is "everything was stolen". Keep a record: who saw what, when, and what you did about it. A notebook is fine. It does not have to be perfect, but it must carry dates and times.
Notification: team, customers, authorities if needed
Team first. The same attacker may have written to colleagues in your name, so send a short, plain note: "My account was compromised; please be careful with suspicious messages from me after this date." Then the affected outside contacts. If a message asked for money in your name, phone the people involved. A written note may not be enough.
If personal data was in the mailbox and was accessed, legal notification duties may apply, and the deadlines can be short. For a Turkish perspective see our article on KVKK breach notification and the 72-hour rule. Do not decide alone; the data controller and a legal adviser should assess it together.
If the incident is tied to a financial instruction (a payment account was changed, a transfer made), call your bank immediately. The first hours decide a lot there. To see how these attacks evolve, read our piece on AI-assisted phishing and BEC.
Preventing a repeat
The cleanup is not finished until you know how the account was taken. The three most common routes: a password typed into a phishing page, a password leaked from another service and reused here, and a device infected with malware. Scan the device, and rebuild it if you can.
Lasting fixes are dull but they work: a separate long password for each user, mandatory 2FA, SPF, DKIM and DMARC for your sending domain, and external forwarding that requires administrator approval. For a fuller list, see our 12-point small business email security checklist. Closing an account the day an employee leaves belongs in the same category; the onboarding and offboarding checklist covers it. These incidents also matter for insurance; our article on cyber insurance and email security lists what applications typically ask.
| Time | Action | Why |
|---|---|---|
| First 30 minutes | Change password from a clean device, end sessions, enable 2FA | Cut the attacker's access |
| First 2 hours | Clear forwards, filters and connected apps | Close hidden doors |
| First 6 hours | Review sent mail, build the scope list | Know what happened |
| First 24 hours | Inform team and affected contacts, call the bank if needed | Limit the damage |
| Following days | Find the root cause, make controls permanent | Prevent a repeat |
Frequently asked questions
How can I be sure my account was compromised?
You cannot always be certain. Messages in Sent that you did not write, sign-ins from unknown devices and hidden forwarding rules are the strongest indicators. When in doubt, change the password and start cleaning up without waiting for certainty.
Is changing the password enough?
No. The attacker may have left a forwarding rule, a filter or a connected client behind. After the password change, check each of those items one by one and turn on two-factor authentication.
Should I tell my customers?
If suspicious mail went to customers from your account, yes, especially if it contained a payment request or a link. A short, honest note stops the fake message doing harm and protects trust.
Do I have to notify a regulator if personal data was involved?
If the mailbox held personal data and it was accessed, a legal notification duty may arise. It depends on the facts of the incident, so assess it together with a legal adviser.
- account takeover
- incident response
- email security
- password
- 2FA