For years, the advice for spotting phishing was to read the grammar. Odd phrasing, missing articles, a logo that looked like it had been photographed off a screen. That advice has aged badly. An attacker can now paste your company's website copy into a language model and ask for a polite but insistent bank-detail-change note addressed to your accounts payable lead, and the output is often cleaner than what our own staff would write at the end of a long day.
This article covers how AI-assisted phishing and business email compromise (BEC) work, which technical controls are worth the effort, and why the real defence lives in the payment process rather than in the mail system.
Short answer: Business email compromise is fraud in which an attacker poses as an executive, vendor or employee by email to get money or information, and often there is no malicious link or attachment at all. DMARC, two-factor authentication and spam filtering narrow the opening, but a message that looks genuine can no longer be treated as proof. The single most effective control is verifying bank-detail changes and urgent payment requests through a second, independent channel.
How the attacks evolved from sloppy to convincing
The telltale sign used to be bad language. It is not any more, and "no typos, so it is safe" has become a dangerous reflex.
What changed is cost and scale. Gathering public information about a target (job titles, tender announcements, press mentions, email signatures) and writing a tailored message used to take hours. That preparation can now be largely automated. Tone matching, a plausible pretext and the right recipient have all become cheap. Voice and video impersonation cases are also in the news; here we stick to the email channel.
We will not quote figures, because the loss and frequency statistics that circulate on this topic often have murky sources. A field observation is safer: the companies that get caught are frequently small and mid-sized firms that assumed nobody would bother with them. The attacker does not need a big vault. One wrong payment is enough.
BEC scenarios: IBAN change, executive request, vendor impersonation
Three patterns cover most cases.
The bank-detail change. A supplier you pay regularly writes that its account has changed and that future payments should go to a new IBAN or account number. The message comes either from the supplier's genuinely compromised mailbox or from a near-identical domain. Everything looks normal except the account number: the invoice format, the thread history, even the subject line.
The executive request. Someone writes in the managing director's name to finance: "I'm in a meeting and can't call, please wire this today, I'll explain tonight." The display name is right; the address is a free webmail account or a slightly altered domain. Urgency and secrecy are the signature.
Vendor or employee impersonation. A message to purchasing or HR claims a bank account was updated. Or the attacker has already taken over a mailbox on the inside and replies to real conversations. This type is the hardest to notice because it comes from your own domain and passes every authentication check.
If you want the different spoofing techniques separated out, our piece on email spoofing and how to stop it treats direct impersonation, display-name tricks and lookalike domains as distinct problems with distinct defences.
The technical layer: DMARC, two-factor authentication, spam filtering
Technical controls shrink the attack surface; they do not eliminate it. We say this early because we have met teams who believed that publishing DMARC settled the matter.
| Control | What it stops | What it does not stop |
|---|---|---|
DMARC p=reject |
Mail that directly forges your exact domain | Mail from lookalike domains or free webmail |
| Two-factor authentication | Logging in to a mailbox with a stolen password | A user who hands over the code voluntarily |
| Spam and virus filtering | Known-bad content and malicious attachments | A clean one-line "our IBAN has changed" message |
| DKIM signing | Tampering with a message in transit | An attacker signing with their own domain |
Each row deserves a short note. DMARC should start at p=none and tighten over time using reports; our DMARC setup guide walks through it. Two-factor authentication is the cheapest way to cut the "stolen mailbox" scenario, and in the Postanex admin panel you can set a two-factor policy for mailboxes, which removes the "who has it on and who does not" guesswork. We compare the methods themselves in email two-factor authentication and passkeys.
Spam and virus filtering can be excellent and still have nothing to catch, because a BEC message carries no malicious link. The burden falls on the next layer.
The process layer: second-channel payment approval
The rule is simple. Bank-detail changes and unusual urgent payment requests are verified through a channel other than the one the request came in on. Do not call the phone number in the email. Call the number from your contract, your ERP or your own records.
A few small adjustments make this workable in a real team:
- A bank-detail change is approved by a second person, not just by whoever processes invoices. No single person should be able to alter payment destinations alone.
- Make a callback rule for executive wire requests and write it down. The executive should not take offence; it is a process, not a judgment of character.
- Start the first payment to a new account with a small test amount and a confirmation, whatever the invoice total.
- Name the "urgent, confidential, do not tell anyone" combination as a red flag.
These rules feel dull. That is the point: they remove the two things the attacker relies on, which are haste and silence.
A red-flag list for employees
A short list you can hand around: an unexpected request for money or data, time pressure, an unusual channel ("message me on WhatsApp instead"), bank details that change at the last minute, a sender address that does not match the display name or a domain spelled slightly differently (examp1e.com instead of example.com), and a new person who suddenly joins a thread and never appeared in earlier messages.
For a wider sweep, share the ten signs in how to recognise a phishing email. In a small company, the best training is showing anonymised real examples in a meeting and making "I'd rather ask" normal. An employee who is scolded for a false alarm will stay quiet next time.
What to do when it happens
If a wrong payment has gone out, minutes matter. Call your bank first and ask for the transfer to be recalled; the earlier the request, the better the chance of stopping the funds. Then save the full message headers, reset the password and active sessions if a mailbox was compromised, and follow the first-24-hours list in what to do when an email account is compromised. Bring in your security or legal adviser early if you have one.
Report the fraud as well. Your bank and local law enforcement are the first stop; in the United States, the FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center takes BEC reports. Write the incident and what you learned on one page. You will want it next time. For a broader baseline, our small business email security checklist is a good companion.
Frequently asked questions
How is BEC different from ordinary phishing?
Ordinary phishing usually lures people to a fake login page to steal passwords or card details. BEC often has no link or attachment and simply asks for a money transfer or sensitive data, which makes it harder for filters to catch.
Does publishing DMARC prevent BEC?
It prevents direct forgery of your exact domain, nothing more. It will not stop mail from a lookalike domain, a free webmail account or a genuinely compromised real mailbox.
We are a small company. Would anyone target us?
Yes, and small firms can be easier targets: one person often makes payments and there is rarely a second approval. Adding a process rule costs no software budget at all.
Can I tell AI-written phishing from the text itself?
Not reliably. Judge the request, not the polish: verify any message that is unexpected, urgent, asks for money or data, or steps outside your usual channel.
- business email compromise
- BEC
- AI phishing
- CEO fraud
- invoice fraud